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Abstract
In incomplete information environments with transferable utility, efficient outcomes are gen-
erally implementable unless interim or ex post participation constraints are imposed on the
problem. In this paper we show that linking a sufficiently large number of independent but
possibly unrelated social decisions, a slightly perturbed Groves mechanism can implement an
efficient outcome with probability arbitrarily close to one, while respecting all participation,
incentive and balanced budget constraints.
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1 Introduction
A common source of inefficiencies in collective decisions problems with privately informed agents
is the interaction between incentive constraints, participation constraints, and resource constraints.
In the absence of participation constraints, ex post efficiency is attainable in models with trans-
ferable utility and private values, since transfers can be set up so that all agents internalize their
externalities (Groves [13], d’Aspremont and Gerard-Varet [11] and Arrow [2]). In contrast, if par-
ticipation and resource constraints are both added to the problem, it is in general impossible to
achieve ex post efficient outcomes.1
In this paper we argue that a natural way to overcome these inefficiencies is to “link” unrelated
problems. The key effect of considering two problems at the same time is that, for each type-
vector realization of each agent, the mechanism designer needs only to be concerned about one
participation constraint, rather than one for each problem. Linking must therefore weakly improve
the allocation, because the set of feasible mechanisms is enlarged.
Our first result is that, in an economy with a sufficiently large number of unrelated decision
problems (that satisfy stochastic independence and some regularity conditions), we can construct
an ex ante budget-balancing Groves mechanism under which the failure of participation constraints
occur with vanishingly small probability. This is both intuitive and straightforward to show. The
key intuition is that, since Groves mechanisms are efficient, lump sum transfers can be constructed
that budget balances in expectation and all agents have a strict incentive to participate, if making
the decision behind a veil of ignorance. But, the average interim utility (where the averaging is over
the decision problems) converges in probability to the average ex ante expected utility. It follows
that violations of participation constraints become rare as the number of decision problems grow
large.
While rare, violations of the participation constraints do in general occur with positive proba-
bility regardless of how many problems are linked. We therefore also ask whether a nearly efficient
mechanism that always fulfill the participation constraints and budget balance can be constructed.
This analysis turns out to be more subtle than the rather direct law of large numbers style reasoning
used to argue that a Groves mechanism is “almost implementable”. The main difficulty is how to
rule out unravelling of the participation constraints. Specifically, to always satisfy the participation
constraints we need to allow agents to opt out of the Groves mechanism. But then, the incentives
1Cramton et al [9], Mailath and Postlewaite [15], and Myerson and Satterthwaite [17] are some well-known exam-
ples.
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to opt into the mechanism depends on which other types will do so. Hence, even if few types have
an incentive to opt out when assuming that all other agents will opt in, the types that opt out
may upset the participation constraints for other types. In general, it is possible that the types
with the most to gain from opting out are the types that contribute the most to social surplus,
implying that there could be negative selection of agents into the mechanism if allowing agents to
veto implementation.
The main result of this paper shows that a mechanism can be constructed so as to rule out
any unravelling of participation constraints. Specifically, we consider a slight perturbation of the
Groves mechanism, which satisfies all constraints — including the participation constraints — for
all type realizations. We show that this mechanism can implement the efficient outcome with a
probability arbitrarily close to one, provided that the number of unrelated decisions is sufficiently
large. The perturbed Groves mechanism has an sequential interpretation where in first stage, all
agents decide whether to agree to play a (particular) Groves mechanism. If some agent decides
to opt out of the mechanism then the status quo outcome that gives all agents their reservation
utility is implemented (i.e., all agents have veto power); if all agents agree to participate in the
Groves mechanism, truth-telling is a conditionally dominant strategy, thus the efficient outcome
is implemented. Interestingly, the use of a Groves mechanism (as opposed to an ex post budget
balanced mechanism) is crucial for our argument, despite the fact that our result “only” is a result
in terms of Bayesian implementability. The reason is that selection becomes irrelevant for behavior
in the “second stage”, which in turn gives a tractable characterization of the “veto game”.
Our paper is most closely related to a recent contribution by Jackson and Sonnenschein [14], who
show that inefficiencies due to incentive constraints can be overcome by linking a large number of
independent replicas of some underlying decision problems. In their mechanism, agents are required
to announce preference profiles such that the frequency of any particular type in the problem that
is replicated coincides with its underlying probability distribution. They show that if the social
choice function the planner seeks to implement is efficient, then a rationing mechanism can be
constructed under which agents try to be as truthful as they can, which in turn implies that with
a large number of independent replicas of the same decision problem, the frequency distribution
of announced preference types will be close to the true probability distribution. As a result, all
equilibria result in approximately efficient allocations with high probability when there are many
replicas.
There are some key differences between our paper and Jackson and Sonnenschein [14]. Most
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importantly, they focus on non-transferable utility environments, while transferable utility is crucial
for our construction.2 In other words, their linking mechanism is primarily designed to overcome
the difficulties involved in creating incentives to reveal intensity of preferences, which is the main
concern in non-transferable utility models.3 In contrast, incentive constraints can be easily satis-
fied in our environment, and the role of linking is directly designed to overcome the participation
constraints. Moreover, while Jackson and Sonnenschein [14] impose few restrictions on their under-
lying social decision problem, it is crucial for their construction that they can link a large number
of identical replicas. In contrast, our results apply to arbitrary sequences of (transferable utility)
problems that satisfy some mild regularity conditions. As a result of these differences, we view our
contribution as complementary to Jackson and Sonnenschein [14].
There is also a connection between our paper and papers on bundling, as well as many other
papers that have noted the advantages of linking across problems in more specific environments.
Here it is very instructive to observe that our construction is a direct generalization of the con-
struction in Armstrong [1], who used a two-part tariff to allow a monopolist to almost fully extract
the surplus in a standard monopoly problem with a large number of commodities (similar construc-
tions are used by Bakos and Brynjolfson [3] and Bergstrom and Bergstrom [4] in the context of
excludable public goods). In contrast, the mechanism utilized by Jackson and Sonnenschein [14] is
more akin to various rationing schemes, such as a vote storage mechanism proposed in Casella [7], a
risk-sharing arrangement proposed by Townsend [19], which limits how often the risk averse agent
can claim a loss, and a compromising scheme proposed by Borgers and Postl [6].
2 Notation and Preliminaries
Consider an environment with  ≥ 2 agents and a set  of possible social decisions. Each
agent  ∈  ≡ {1 2  } is privately informed about a preference parameter  ∈ Θ and has a






2An interpretation of Jackson and Sonnenscheins’ rationing mechanism is that it provides an ingenious way of
creating transferrable utility out of a non-transferrable utility environment by adding constraints on the available
announcements agents can make.
3They do also discuss how to deal with participation constraints.
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where 
 is interpreted as a transfer from agent  in terms of a numeraire good. Also assume
that implementing decision 	 ∈  costs (	) ∈ R units of the numeraire good. Moreover, let
Θ = ×=1Θ denote the set of all possible type profiles, and denote a generic element of Θ by 
By appeal to the revelation principle we restrict our attention to direct mechanisms. A pure
direct revelation mechanism (henceforth called mechanism) is a pair h 
i  where  : Θ →  is
the allocation rule and 
 : Θ →  is the cost sharing rule, where 
 () = ¡
1 ()  
2 ()  
 ()¢ 
We adopt the convention that a positive 
 () is a transfer from agent  when  is announced. We
say that a mechanism is incentive compatible if truth-telling is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in the
incomplete information game induced by h 
i. Dominant strategy incentive compatibility will be
explicitly referred to as such.
Since utility function (1) is quasi-linear and the valuation function  is one with private values
(that is,  depends only on ), many classical implementation results apply. In particular, as
long as neither ex post budget balance or participation constraints and ex ante budget balancing
constraints are simultaneously imposed, any efficient social decision rule can be implemented in
dominant strategies by a Groves mechanism. For easy reference, it will be useful to define this class
of mechanisms explicitly.
Definition 1 A mechanism h 
i is a Groves mechanism if for each 








and, where for each  ∈ 













and   : Θ− → R may be arbitrarily chosen.
3 Problems with Many Independent Social Decisions
In this section we describe an economy with many independent social decisions. In doing this,
it is convenient to refer to the social decision in an economy with a single decision as an issue












denote an economy with a single issue  Here, Θ denotes the
issue- type-space for agent . For each issue  the types  ∈ Θ are stochastically independent
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across agents, and   is consequently both the prior probability distribution over Θ

 and the
percieved probability distribution over Θ for all other agents. Preferences over different ways to
resolve issue  are described by the valution function  : Θ

 × → R, where  is the set of
possible alternatives for issue . The von Neumann-Morgernstern utility for a type- agent  in






for each 	 ∈  where 
 is a transfer of the numeraire good. Finally,  :  → R describes the
cost of implementing each alternative 	 ∈  in terms of the numeraire good.
Let E = {}=1 denote an economy with  social issues indexed by  ∈ {1 }  A social
decision in economy E corresponds with a resolution for each issue and a transfer scheme. We let
D = ×=1 denote the set of social decisions in the −issue economy . For each 	 ∈ D  the




 (	)  (5)
The type-space for agent  in economy E is given by Θ () = ×=1Θ and we write Θ () ≡
×=1Θ ()  and Θ− () ≡ × 6=Θ ()  The von Neumann-Morgernstern utility function for a
















Next, we assume that the issue-specific types of each agent are independently distributed across




































To deal with participation constraints at a reasonable level of generality, we postulate that for




























denote agent 0 reservation utility in a -issue economy E 





¢ ∈ ×=1Θ denote an issue- type profile. Let
∗ () denote an efficient social decision rule and  () the associated maximized value of the
social surplus in this economy with a single issue  that is
















where we assume that appropriate continuity and compactness assumptions are satisfied to make








for every  ∈ ×=1Θ However, to avoid trivialities we restrict attention to the case where the
expected social surplus from each issue is uniformly bounded away from the reservation utilities.
Moreover, we also require that the social surplus associated with each issue be bounded from above
and below. Together, we refer to these restrictions as regularity conditions. Formally,
Definition 2 We say that {}∞=1 is a regular sequence of single-issue economies if
R1 [Non-vanishing Gains from Trade]. There exists some   0 such that








+  for all ;
R2 [Uniform Bounds on Surplus]. There exist some   ̄ such that    ()  ̄ for all
 ∈ ×=1Θ and for all ;4





̄ for all , all  ∈ Θ and all 
4We can, without loss of generality, assume that ̄  0 If ̄  0 we can always add a constant larger than |̄|  to
all utility functions. Since the reservation utilities are defined in terms of the default outcomes this does not change
the problem.
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3.1 Remarks about the Environment
1. We kept the set of agents the same and finite for all problems. Since we can allow agents
with trivial roles for any issue  the restriction can be rephrased as saying that the union of
the set of agents over all issues is finite.
2. Throughout the model we made many strong separability assumptions. For example, payoffs
and costs are assumed to be additively separable across different issues; and for each agent
the list of issue-specific types are stochastically independent. Moreover, the type parameter
 is assumed to affect how agent  evaluates issue  and no other issues. These separable
assumptions are weaker than it appears. If any of these assumptions fail for a pair of issues,
we can always bunch these two issues into a single issue. We can do this because we do not
impose any dimensionality restrictions on either the issue specific set of alternatives or type
spaces. As it will become clear later, our results hinge on the existence of a sufficiently large
number of truly independent and separate problems for our results, but do not require that
all problems be independent and separate.
3. Our model also assumes that, for each issue, agents’ types are stochastically independent.
This assumption is maintained because, if types were correlated across agents, then it is
usually possible to construct efficient mechanisms similar to that of Cremer and McLean [10]
that respects both participation and resource constraints, without any role for linking the
issues.
4. Our environment is general enough to incorporate both public goods and private goods prob-
lems. For example, Armstrong’s [1] non-linear pricing problem with many products fits nicely
in this framework. Consider each issue  as corresponding to a product. The set of alter-
natives for issue  ∈ R will then correspond to a quantity choice for product  for each
consumer. Agent 0 valuation function  depends on the quantity choice for  i.e. -th com-
ponent of 	 (see Section 5.1 for more discussion). Myerson and Satterswaite’s [17] bilateral
bargaining problem also fits in as an issue  in our setup. A bilateral bargaining problem can
be represented by an action space  = [0 1], denoting the probability that agent 1 will ob-
tain the good. Besides agents 1 and 2 — the two agents in the bargaining situation — all other
agents’ preferences on this issue are simply independent of 	 Mailath and Postlewaite’s [15]
many-agent bargaining problem with public goods can similarly be incorporated as an issue
in our setup.
7
4 The Implementation Problem
The goal of the mechanism designer is to implement an efficient allocation, subject to incen-
tive compatibility, individual rationality and resource constraints. We write h (·)  
 (·)i for a















 ()  

¢− 
 ()¤ ≥ E− £  ¡ ¡0 −¢  ¢− 
 ¡0 ¢¤ (11)
∀ ∈   0 ∈ Θ () 





 ()  

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is defined in (9). Finally, the resource constraint is imposed in the ex ante form,








A seemingly more stringent way to impose the resource constraint would be to require that the
resources balance for each realized type profile, that is




 () ∀ ∈ Θ ()  (14)
When types are correlated or when stronger notions of incentive compatibility are considered,
results sometimes depend on the form of the budget balance constraint. However, for the setup we
consider in this paper (13) and (14) are equivalent:
Proposition 1 (Borgers and Norman [5]) Suppose that each agent has a utility function of
the form  (	 )− 
 and that there exists a pair of agents ( ) such that  and  are stochasti-
cally independent. Then, for every mechanism satisfying (13) there is a mechanism with the same
allocation rule  that satisfies (14) and generates the same interim expected payments for all agents
as the original mechanism.
By Proposition 1 we note that if, as we assume, types are stochastically independent, then for
any h 
i that is (Bayesian) incentive compatible, individually rational and ex ante budget balanced
we can find transfers such that the same social decision rule satisfies ex post budget balance and
all other constraints.5
5Applied to a Groves mechanism, this is the well-known AGV implementation result due to d’Aspremont and
Gerard-Varet [11].
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5 The Groves Mechanism Almost Works when Many Problems
Are Linked
We now consider a sequence of economies {E}∞=1 and examine the results when  is suffi-
ciently large. Let







¢− C (	)  (15)






























 is given by
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lump sum transfer independent of 0s announcement
Clearly truth-telling is a dominant strategy, implying that incentive constraints (11) are satisfied.
Moreover, routine calculations show that the ex ante balanced budget constraint (13) holds. The
only issue is thus the participation constraints (12). We denote the interim expected payoff for
agent  with type  in economy E under the proposed Groves mechanism h∗  
	
i  when other









= E− [ ()]− − 1



















 ()  (20)
where  () is defined in (10). The additive form of (20) and stochastic independence across issues
suggests that  ()  should converge in probability to its expectation as  goes to infinity,









 should converge in probability to its
expectation. But, inspecting the expressions in (19), this suggests that the interim expected payoff
should be close to its expectation, which is the difference between social surplus and the reservation
utilities summed over all agents. Hence, it seems quite plausible that almost all participation
constraints will be satisfied under some appropriate regularity conditions. Indeed, the proposition
below establishes that this is the case for a sequence of economies consisting of regular issues:
Proposition 2 Suppose that {E}∞=1 is sequence of economies consisting of stochastically inde-
pendent regular issues (in the sense of Definition 2). Moreover, for each  let (∗  
	
) be the







¢− ¡¢ ≥ 0¤ ≥ 1−  (21)
for every  and every  ≥ ∗ () 
The interpretation of the result is that the probability that all participation constraints in (12)
are satisfied (i.e., (1− )) can be made arbitrarily close to one when we link a sufficiently large
number of independent social decisions using a standard Groves mechanism with appropriately
chosen lump sum transfers.
Proof. Since  () =
P





























For notational brevity, define  
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¢− ¡¢ = X
=1
  ¡¢− E £  ¡¢¤+ 1
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X
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¢ ≥   (24)













is a sequence of independent variables. Finally, since all
10




is bounded from above and below by (R2) and (R3), thus there exists
























































































































→ 0 as  →∞, we conclude that for every   0 there exists some finite integer ∗ ()
such that (21) is satisfied for agent  Since  is finite we then just let ∗ () = max∈ ∗ () and
the result follows.
5.1 Application: Armstrong’s [1] Multiproduct Monopolist Problem
While Proposition 2 is about “almost implementing” efficient allocations, the logic in the proof
of Proposition 2 can be used to understand Armstrong’s [1] analysis of a multiproduct monopolist
with  private goods. Armstrong assumes that each good  is produced at constant unit cost
" Efficiency is trivially implementable in this environment by marginal cost pricing, but profit
maximization will lead to inefficiencies due to informational rents for the consumers. His main result
is that when  is sufficiently large, a cost-based two-part tariff can be almost profit maximizing in
the sense that the monopolist extracts almost all consumer surplus.
Due to the constant unit cost assumption, each consumer can be treated separately, so there is





for the utility function of the consumer, where 	 is now is to be interpreted as the quantity of good
 consumed. It can be seen from (15) and (18) that the Groves mechanism in this environment
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reduces to marginal cost pricing together with a lump sum transfer where


















() + # (27)
where # is a lump sum transfer that does not depend on  Thus mechanism (17) reduces to a two-
part tariff in this case, where the consumer pays a fixed fee of # for the right to purchase goods at
marginal costs. While the budget-balanced Groves mechanism will imply # = 0 (obvious from (15)
by setting  = 1) the approximately profit maximizing two-part tariff is to set # = (1− )E [ ()]










and   0 can be made arbitrarily small. A
straightforward application of law of large numbers imply that such a two-part tariff satisfies the
consumer’s participation constraint almost always, and, since the problem can be solved separately
for each consumer the mechanism becomes exactly incentive feasible if types that are not willing
to pay # are allowed to opt out. This is exactly the construction Armstrong [1] uses to establish
that the monopolist can extract almost the full surplus if there are many goods.
6 An Asymptotically Efficient Perturbation of the Groves Mech-
anism
While Proposition 2 is suggestive, it does not directly provide a solution to the implementation
problem stated in Section 4. The reason is as follows. Even though the probability of the violation
of participation constraints can be made arbitrary small by linking sufficiently many problems, for
any finite  the probability of a violation will in general be strictly positive.
An obvious remedy for this is to revert to the status quo outcome whenever a participation
constraint is violated, which, since the failures are rare when  is large, would create a mechanism
that is almost efficient. The problem with this idea, however, is that the agents that opt out change
the interim expected payoff from participation for the agents that opt in.6 It is therefore not obvious
6This issue is not relevant for private goods problems such as Armstrong [1] where the efficient outcome for agent
 does not depend on others’ types. Similarly, in the analysis of excludable public goods (Bakos and Brynjofson [3],
Bergstrom and Bergstrom [4] and Fang and Norman [12]) the reservation utility for a consumer can be attained by
simply excluding the consumer from usage. As a result, approximate efficiency can be attained by a slight modification
of the Groves mechanism in Section 5.
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whether such a mechanism can be constructed in a way that guarantees that the participation
constraints hold for all types, and, at the same time, the Groves mechanism is implemented for
almost all type profiles. More precisely, we have to deal with the following issue. When some agents
opt out of the mechanism, this may diminish the value of playing the Groves mechanism for the
remaining agents. In fact, the types that opt out may actually be the types that contribute the
most to the social surplus, if these types have reservation utilities that are high enough. Hence,
if types with interim payoffs in the Groves mechanism below the reservation utilities opt out, the
best response for the remaining types may be that some additional types should opt out. The set
of types that agree to play the Groves mechanism must therefore somehow be determined through
a “fixed point” argument, and a priori it is unclear how to rule out that the only “fixed point”
implements the status quo for sure, even when the probability that the original Groves mechanism
violates a participation constraint is small.
6.1 A Perturbed Groves Mechanism
Constructing a sequence of almost efficient mechanisms satisfying the constraints (11), (12), and
(13) for all type realizations is complicated by the fixed point problem discussed above. We choose
to deal with this by constructing a mechanism where the message space is enlarged to include a
choice on whether or not to play the Groves mechanism. This construction has the advantage that
the mechanism is easy to describe, and that we can “solve” the fixed point problem by appealing
to an off-the-shelf existence result from Milgrom and Weber [16].7
Formally, we add a message $ ∈ {0 1} to the message space, so that each agent reports a pair¡
$ 
¢
 The extra message$ is interpreted as the decision on whether or not to accept to play the
Groves mechanism. Specifically, we assume that if each agents report$ = 1 then the Groves mech-
anism is implemented, whereas it any agent  chooses$ = 0 the default outcome 	0 is implemented












 () + 4 if $ = (1 1  1)0 otherwise,
7 In contrast, constructing sequences of direct revelation mechanisms generates a fixed point problem in the set of




 () is given by the Groves transfer scheme in (18), and  is the lower bound on the per
issue gains from trade defined in (R1). One may think of (28) as a sequential mechanism, where in
stage 1 each agent announces whether or not to opt in. If any agents opt out, then the game is over
and the status quo outcome is implemented. If, instead, all agents opt in, then the game proceeds
into the second stage, where Groves mechanism with almost the same transfers as in Section 5 is
implemented.
The reason for the added term 4 in the transfer scheme is to ensure that






when  is sufficiently large, which ensures existence of a transfer that balances the budget exactly
(see the discussion following Proposition 3).
6.2 The Approximate Efficiency Result
Our main result of the paper establishes that, if the underlying sequence of single-issue economies
is regular, then mechanism (28) has equilibria that implement the efficient outcome with probability
arbitrarily close to one, provided that sufficiently many issues are linked. Formally,
Proposition 3 Suppose that {E}∞=1 is sequence of economies consisting of stochastically inde-
pendent regular issues (in the sense of Definition 2). Then, for every   0 there exists some finite
∗ () such that, for every economy E with  ≥ ∗ ()  there exists an equilibrium in the game
induced by mechanism (28) where the efficient outcome is implemented with probability at least
1− , and where (29) is satisfied.
Notice that the participation constraints are trivially satisfied by mechanism (28) since every
agent can guarantee her reservation utility by announcing $ = 0 Since any (expected) budget
surplus can be repaid to the agents in a lump-sum fashion without upsetting any incentive or
participation constraints, this ensures existence of a mechanism that satisfies the ex ante budget
balance constraint (13), and, by appeal to Proposition 1 this in turns implies the existence of
a mechanism that satisfies the ex post budget balance constraint (14). Hence, all the constraints
discussed in Section 4 can be satisfied by an approximately optimal mechanism if  is large enough.
Intuitively, the explanation for Proposition 3 is that truth-telling is a dominant strategy, con-
ditional on opting in. Moreover, when opting out, the reported type is irrelevant. Together, this
implies that assuming truth-telling of the type message is without loss of generality, and the only
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issue is whether to opt in or out. Assuming that almost all types of the other agents decide to opt in,
the situation is not all that different from the regular Groves mechanism. Indeed, the formal proof
shows that, if the number of issues is large enough, then there is a set of types with probability
measure close to unity, such that all these types want to opt in if they believe that other agents of
these types also opt in. This argument is for arbitrary behavioral strategies for types outside the
set. Hence, it only remains to show that there are some equilibrium strategies for the remaining
types, which can be done by appealing to a standard existence argument.
6.3 The Proof
Truth-telling is dominant “in the second stage” if all players opt in, and there is nothing to
loose from truth-telling if opting out. This is true regardless of whether or not other players report
truthfully. However, to reduce the need for additional notation we will only show this assuming
truth-telling by all other agents.8
Allowing randomizations over $ we let % : Θ





that type  chooses $ = 1 Following standard conventions we let % =
¡


















under the assumption that all other agents report type truthfully and
choose to opt in according to an arbitrary %− : Θ






















and express the interim expected payoff (conditional on truth-telling) for player  as
   −   =

 

























if  = 0
 (31)
where  () is the surplus and
#  ≡ −
− 1

















8 In the end, the extra “bite” that comes from the dominance of truth-telling will not be of any help, since agents
need to make probabilistic assessments when deciding on the choice of 
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is the (negative of the) “conditional lump-sum” part of the transfer in (28). A best response where
agent  always tells the truth can then be characterized in terms of the interim expected payoff
function as follows:
Lemma 1 Suppose that each agent  6=  reports type truthfully and chooses $ in accordance to
rule % : Θ
 ()→ [0 1]. Then, it is a best response for agent  to always report truthfully and to
follow the rule e%  where;
1. e% ¡¢ = 1 whenever b  ¡$ %−  ¢   ¡¢
2. e% ¡¢ = 0 whenever b  ¡$ %−  ¢   ¡¢
Lemma 1 is a more or less direct consequence of truth-telling being dominant in the Groves






 ∈ Θ () | 
¡

¢− ¡¢ ≥ 2
¾
 (33)




is defined in (19), using the Groves mechanism in the
previous section. To interpret Θ





¢− ¡¢  so Θ () is a set of agent ’s types for which her interim expected surplus is at
least 12 of this lower bound. The reason why this set is useful is that, just like the set of agents for
which the participation constraints are fulfilled under the Groves mechanism, the probability that 
belongs to (33) can be made arbitrarily close to one by considering a sufficiently large  However,
since the types in the set (33) have a strict incentive to participate in the Groves mechanism, there
is now some room to consider small deviations from the Groves mechanism without upsetting their
participation constraints.
It will be convenient to introduce some notation for sets of type profiles where all agents have
types in this set, so we let
Θ () =
n








− ∈ Θ− () | ∈ Θ () for each  6= 
o
 (35)
Using an argument which is very similar to the proof of Proposition 2 we first establish that for
large  the probability that − belongs to Θ− () is near one:
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Lemma 2 Suppose that {E}∞=1 is sequence of economies consisting of stochastically independent






≥ 1−  for
all  ≥  0 () 
Define E−
£
 () |Θ− ()
¤
as the interim expectation of the social surplus under an efficient
social decision rule for agent  conditional on his own type  and conditional on the types of the
other agents being in the set Θ− ()  Intuitively, this conditional expectation E−
£
 () |Θ− ()
¤
should be near the unconditional expectation of the social surplus E− [ ()] in the Groves mecha-
nism when is large. That is, since the probability that − lies in Θ− () can be made arbitrarily
close to one by linking sufficiently many problems, the regular conditional expectation is almost
exclusively taken over Θ− ()  Using the regularity assumptions (R2) and (R3) we show that:
Lemma 3 Suppose that {E}∞=1 is sequence of economies consisting of stochastically independent
regular issues. Then, for every   0 there exists finite  00 () such that for all  ≥  00 () 
E−
£
 () |Θ− ()
¤

≥ E− [ ()]

−  for all  ∈ Θ () 
In the next step, we combine Lemma 2 with Lemma 3, and use the uniform bounds on the
per-issue surplus and reservation utilities (R2 and R3) to show that, when  is sufficiently large, it
is a best response for agent  with types in Θ

() defined in (33) to play the Groves mechanism if
all other agents with types in the set Θ
−
() defined in (35) decide to do so. In essence, the logic
is that since all agents opt in with a probability close to one, it doesn’t matter what the remaining
agents do.
Lemma 4 Suppose that {E}∞=1 is sequence of economies consisting of stochastically independent




= 1 for each type




= 1 for each  ∈ Θ ().
Lemma 4 is the crucial step in the argument since it establishes that for  large enough each
agent  and every type  ∈ Θ () has an incentive to opt in to play the Groves mechanism,
provided they expect every type  ∈ Θ () to do so for every other agent 
Lemma 5 Suppose that {E}∞=1 is sequence of economies consisting of stochastically independent




= 1 for each  ∈ Θ (). Then, there exists finite
∗∗such that (29) is satisfied for all  ≥ ∗∗.
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converges in probability to unity and since the
mechanism would run a budget surplus of 4 if all agents would agree to play the Groves mechanism
for sure. A proof is in the appendix for completeness.
We have already established that the probability that  belongs to Θ

() approaches one as 
goes about of bounds, so the only remaining step is to argue that we can find equilibrium strategies
for the remaining types:
Proof of Proposition 3. Consider a (fictitious) game where$ = 1 is the only available action for
types inΘ

() and where types inΘ () \Θ ()may choose$ ∈ {0 1}, and the interim expected
payoffs are given by (31) The action space is finite for each player, so payoffs are equicontinuous
in the sense of Milgrom and Weber [16] (see Proposition 1 in Milgrom and Weber [16]). Moreover,
stochastic independence implies that the information structure is absolutely continuous (Proposition
3 in Milgrom and Weber [16]). Applying Theorem 1 in Milgrom and Weber the game has an
equilibrium in distributional strategies. Since the action space is finite, we can represent this





whenever  ∈ Θ ()  But, applying Lemma 4 it follows that that there exists ∗  ∞ such
that %∗ is an equilibrium also when types in Θ

() have the option to freely pick $ ∈ {0 1} 
which by use of Lemma 5 implies that (29) is satisfied for  ≥ max {∗∗∗}  Moreover, for any






≥ 1−  for each
  
0
(). Finally, Lemma 1 guarantees that truth-telling is optimal provided that each agent
announce $ in accordance with %∗  The result follows by letting ∗ () = max {∗∗∗ 0 ()} 
7 Discussion
7.1 Weak versus Strong Implementation
The approximate efficiency result in Proposition 3 is in terms of Bayesian implementation,
whereas the “almost incentive feasible” Groves mechanism (17) obviously implements the efficient
outcome in dominant strategies. Also notice that there are always an equilibria of the perturbed
Groves mechanism (28) where the status quo outcome is implemented for sure. If one agent opts
out regardless of realized type it is a best response for all other agents to do so as well. We don’t
think that there is any way to resolve this indeterminacy through additional non-type messages.
18
7.2 Governments as Linking Mechanisms
Real world government institutions usually fulfil many and arguably quite unrelated functions,
and the results in this paper can be seen as a simple theory explaining this, as far as we know, previ-
ously unexplained fact. The existing theory of public finance has identified many potential sources
of market failure, and interpreted these as a rationale for “government intervention.” However, the
existing theory only explains that it may be beneficial to set up some institution to deal with each
particular market failure, but does not provide a foundation for why a single government institution
should be responsible for dealing with all these problem. For example, we understand that there are
externalities involved in garbage collection, that public parks would be under-provided by voluntary
provisions, and that for-profit policing may be a bad idea, but it seems hard to argue that there
are any technological reasons for why these services should be provided jointly as part of a local
government bundle, as they tend to be. The results in this paper suggest a possible explanation
that linking all these seemingly unrelated social decisions via a single government institution helps
achieve efficiency by alleviating citizens’ participation constraints.
7.3 Vetoing versus Exclusions
Applied to an economy with  public goods, mechanism (28) does not distinguish between
excludable and non-excludable public goods. Either all agents opt in and consume all the public
goods that are produced, or a veto is cast, in which case none of the public goods is provided. Since
the probability of a veto goes to zero as  goes out of bounds, use exclusions are not needed for
asymptotic efficiency.
This “asymptotic irrelevance of exclusions” depends crucially on the fact that we keep the
number of agents  fixed. In contrast, Norman [18] and Fang and Norman [12] demonstrate that
the exclusion instrument is a crucial feature of the constrained optimal mechanism when  is fixed
(to 1 and 2 respectively) and  is large.
It should be clear that our proofs don’t apply to sequences where both  and  tend to
infinity. We don’t have a proof, but we conjecture that in the case of non-excludable public goods,
asymptotic efficiency is impossible if and  go out of bounds at the same rate. On the other hand,
if goods are excludable, there is no need to equip agents with veto power; reservation utilities can
be attained by the “milder” exclusion instrument. As a result, asymptotic efficiency is attainable
in this case (regardless of the asymptotic behavior of ). Indeed, since the efficient provision for
good  converges either to “always provide” or “never provide” as  tends to infinity approximate
19
efficiency can be implemented with a mechanism where the provision decisions are done ex ante and
a fixed price is charged for access to all public goods, much in the same spirit as Armstrong’s [1]
two-part tariff scheme.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. Assuming that all other agents announce truthfully and that$ = (1  1) = 1 is announced,
the ex post payoff for agent  of type  from announcement b is
&





³b −´  ´+ #  
where #  is defined in (32). By construction, 
∗





=  () − #   For $ 6= 1 we have that &
³b$ ´ =  ¡¢ for any b
Taking expectations over − gives the result.
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A.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. Using the expression for  
¡

¢ −  ¡¢ in equation (23), we can proceed just like in
that proof, with the only difference being that now the calculation is for a bound on the probability
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→ 0 as  →∞, we conclude that, for every   0 there exists some finite integer  0 ()







≤ 1− (1− ) 1−1 














for every  ≥  0 () 
A.3 Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. By regularity assumption (R2), there is a uniform bound ̄  0 so that  () ≤ ̄ for every














































































A.4 Proof of Lemma 4




= 1 for all  6=  and all  ∈ Θ ()  the interim expected payoff
for agent  from setting $ = 1 as defined in (31) can be written as
  1 −   = 
−































































is uniformly bounded below by
 (by R3), we can bound #  as defined in (32) as follows:
#  ≡ −
− 1




























Moreover  () is uniformly bounded below by  (by R2), so  () ≥  We conclude that















where the strict inequality follows since   ̄ Hence,Z
−∈Θ−()\Θ−()
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Combining (A1) and (A2) we obtain
















By Lemma 3, there exists 1 so that for each  ≥ 1
E−
h
 () |Θ− ()
i






where   0 is the uniform bound of the difference between the maximized expected surplus and
























for every  ≥ 1 By (19), we know that E− [ ()] + #  + 4 is the interim expected payoff for
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approaches one, so there exists 2  0
such that b (1 %− )− ¡¢ ≥ 0 if Pr hΘ− ()i ≥ 1− 2. Lemma 2 assures that there exists






≥ 1− 2 for every  ≥ 2 For ∗ = max {12} it therefore follows
that b (1 %− )− ¡¢ ≥ 0
A.5 Proof of Lemma 5








denote the probability that $ = (1  1) given type profile  ∈
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¢− 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(− 1) (E [ ()]−  ()) + 
4
+ C (b ($))¸
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But, E [ ()] =
R
∈Θ()  ()	 ()+
R























































1− Pr £Θ ()¤¢ (− )
where the inequality follows since E [ ()] + 4  ,  ()   and E [ ()]   by
assumption [R2]. Since Pr
£
Θ ()
¤→ 1 as  →∞ it follows that there exists some finite ∗∗ such
that the expected surplus is positive for any  ≥ ∗∗
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